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Comments
Were the Louisiana Rules of Civil Evidence
Affected by the Adoption of the Louisiana
Code of Criminal Procedure?
History of Louisiana Evid.nce Rules
From the delivery of Louisiana to the United States in 1803,
until 1805, the complete body of the Spanish law of evidence was
theoretically in force. In 1805, the Crimes Act' and the Practice
Act2 came into effect. The Crimes Act incorporated as a system
1. La. Acts 1804, c. 50, p. 416; approved May 4, 1805.
2. La. Acts 1804, c. 26, p. 210; approved April 10, 1805.
[568]
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the common law rules of evidence for prosecutions involving
the crimes enumerated in that act.8 The Practice Act, enacted a
month prior to the Crimes Act, provided rules for the swearing
and competency of witnesses,4 but made no provision for other
rules of evidence.5 The Civil Code of 1808 provided rules for the
proof of obligations6 and clarified the rules as to the competency
of witnesses;7 still there were no provisions for such matters as
the exclusion of hearsay, cross-examination, and the various priv-
ileges.
In 1811, the court was considering common law evidence
authorities in a civil cases without any discussion as to the appro-
3. La. Acts 1804, c. 50, § 33, p. 440: "And be it further enacted, That all
the crimes, offences and misdemeanors herein before named, shall be taken,
intended and construed, according to and in conformity with the common
law of England; and that the forms of indictment, (divested however of
unnecessary prolixity) the method of trial; the rules of evidence, and all
other proceedings whatsoever in the prosecution of the said crimes, offences
and misdemeanors, changing what ought to be changed, shall be except as
is by this act otherwise provided fbr, according to the said common law."
4. La. Acts 1804, c. 26, § 19, p. 250: "And be it further enacted, That the
examination of all witnesses shall be taken in open court, or before such
persons as the court may, in each cause authorize to take the same, and
that all witnesses shall previous to giving testimony, be sworn to declare the
truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, relative to the matter in
dispute between the parties ... "
La. Acts 1804, c. 26, § 9, p. 222: "... and no free white witness of the age
of discretion shall be disqualified from testifying on the ground of being
incompetent, unless such witness shall, at the time of producing him, be
interested or infamous: all other exceptions shall go to the credit, and not
to the competence of the witness: Provided however, That the wife and
husband shall not give testimony for or against each other."
5. The legislature must have intended for the courts to apply some rules
of evidence other than those mentioned in the Practice Act: ". . . and if
such witness, without any legal objection, shall refuse to answer or testify
in the cause, it shall be lawful for said court to fine the said witness ....
(Italics supplied.) La. Acts 1804, c. 26, § 19, p. 250, 256. The Practice Act does
not mention any privilege of the witness not to testify.
6. LA. CIVIL CODE of 1808, 3.3.215-64, pp. 304-17, "Of The Proof Of Obliga-
tions And Of That Of Payment."
7. LA. CIVIL CODE of 1808, 3.3.248-9, p. 312:
"Art. 248. The competent witness of any covenant or fact whatever it
may be in civil matters, is that who is above the age of fourteen years com-
plete, of a sound mind, free or enfranchised, and not one of those whom the
law deems infamous.
"He must besides be not interested neither directly or indirectly in the
cause.
"The husband cannot be a witness either for or against his wife, nor the
wife for or against her husband, neither can ascendants with respect to their
descendants, or the descendants with respect to their ascendants."
"Art. 249. The circumstance of the witness being a relation in the collat-
eral line as far as the fourth degree inclusively of one of the parties inter-
ested in the cause, or engaged in the actual service or salary of one of the
said parties, or a free coloured person, is not a sufficient cause to consider
the witness as incompetent, but may according to circumstances diminish the
extent of his credibility."
8. Durnford v. Clark, 1 Mart.(O.S.) 202 (La. 1811).
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priateness of the common law in this field. In 1819, in Planters'
Bank v. George,9 the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the
Spanish law had been repealed by common consent and that the
common law rules of evidence should be followed in civil cases. 10
In 1825, the legislature adopted a Code of Practice and a Civil
Code, but no provision was made in these codes for general rules
of evidence because it was then contemplated that a code of evi-
dence would soon be adopted. The codes adopted restated the
rules of the Practice Act, and the Civil Code of 1808. The only
important addition to these rules was the adoption of the at-
torney-client privilege."
Livingston, discussing the need for his proposed code of evi-
dence, 12 lists the rules of evidence then in force as: common law
evidence for criminal cases involving crimes listed in the Crimes
Act; Spanish rules of evidence for crimes under Spanish criminal
law still in force; 13 the rules of evidence of the Civil Code for
civil cases. Although he stated no opinion as to the proper rules
of civil evidence for situations not covered by the Civil Code, he
expressed no disagreement with the Planters' Bank decision.
Livingston's code of evidence, modeled on the common law, was
to have been applicable to all types of actions; but his code was
not adopted and the courts continued to apply common law evi-
dence rules in all proceedings until the adoption of the Code of
Criminal Procedure in 1928.
Common law rules of evidence are in general the same for
civil and criminal actions; 14 and our Supreme Court, in a case
9. 6 Mart.(O.S.) 670 (La. 1819).
10. Id. at 673-4: "Upon a question of this kind, the ancient laws of the
country can afford no assistance. Laws which required torture to be inflicted
on witnesses, suspected of participation in a crime, to compel them to reveal
their own guilt and infamy, would not be very tender in protecting a witness,
when his interest alone was at stake. Such laws, being at open war with the
principles of a free government, must be considered as abrogated, in common
with all dispositions repugnant to the liberality of our institutions.-Hence,
as much from a tacit conviction that the former laws of evidence are some-
times adverse to the privileges of freemen, as from the introduction of trial
by jury with all its concomitants and consequences, it has grown into
practice to resort, upon questions of evidence, to the principles recognized
in a country where liberty directs the administration of justice."
11. Art. 2262, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1825, now Art. 2283, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
12. LIVINGSTON, A SYSTEM OF PENAL LAW FOR THE STATE OF LOUISIANA 253 et
seq. (1833).
13. Livingston maintained that the Crimes Act repealed only the Spanish
criminal law which was inconsistent with the provisions of that act. Id. at
59, 157, n. a.
14. 1 BEST, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 94 (Morgan's ed.
1875), cited by the dissent in State v. Batson, 108 La. 479, 491-2, 32 So. 478, 483
(1902), quoted in note 24 infra; 1 WHARTON, EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES § 1
(11th ed. 1935); 1 WIOMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVI-
DENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 4(2) (3d ed. 1940).
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decided in 1927, shortly before the adoption of the Code of Crim-
inal Procedure, held that this was true in Louisiana.15 Marr,
writing on criminal procedure in 1923,16 and Cross, writing on
civil practice in 1912,17 both cited civil and criminal cases indis-
criminately in their discussion of evidence. Mr. St. Clair Adams,
one of the redactors of the Code of Criminal Procedure, listed
civil cases as the basis of many of the rules of evidence contained
in the code.' s It seems certain, then, that prior to 1928, Louisiana
civil and criminal evidence rules were the same.
Effect of the Adoption of the Code of Criminal Procedure
In attempting to determine the effect, if any, of the adoption
of the Code of Criminal Procedure on civil evidence rules, the
pertinent articles of the code will be discussed under the follow-
ing categories: 19
(1) Articles which are different from prior statutes on
civil evidence.20
15. State v. Wilson, 163 La. 29, 111 So. 484 (1927).
16. MARR, THE CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE OF LOUISIANA §§ 562-651 (1923).
17. CROSS, PRACTICE IN THE COURTS OF LOUISIANA §§ 126-223 (1912).
18. ADAMS, ANNOTATED CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE OF THE STATE OF LOUI-
SIANA tit. xxxii, c. 7-8; tit. xxxiii (1929).
19. There is no discussion of the status of prior civil evidence rules,
statutory or common law, concerning topics not touched upon in the Code of
Criminal Procedure. As Mr. Adams points out in the preface to his code
(id. at iii), the redactors of the Code of Criminal Procedure did not even
purport to replace all of the prior criminal procedure rules. See also LA.
R.S. § 15:0.2 (1950). It is inconceivable, therefore, that the code affected
prior civil evidence rules not covered in the code.
20. The following articles of the Code of Criminal Procedure contain
provisions different to some extent from the civil evidence statutes listed
with them.
Art. 366, LA. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. (1928): "Before any witness shall be
permitted to testify he shall be sworn to truthfully answer such questions
as may be propounded to him."
Art. 479, LA. CODE OF PRACTICE of 1870: "If the religious opinions
of a witness are opposed to his taking an oath, his affirmation of the
truth of his testimony shall suffice."
Art. 370, LA. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. (1928): "It is within the sound dis-
cretion of the trial judge to permit or to refuse to permit the prosecution or
the defense to bring additional testimony after the evidence has been closed,
provided that no additional evidence shall be heard after the argument has
begun or the charge been given."
Art. 484, LA. CODE OF PRACTICE of 1870: "After all incidental
questions shall have been decided, and both parties haVe produced
their respective evidence, the argument commences; no witness then
can be heard, nor proof introduced except with the consent of all the
parties." Of. Succession of Robinson, 186 La. 389, 396, 172 So. 429, 431
(1936); Succession of Lefort, 139 La. 51, 67, 71 So. 215, 220 (1916).
Art. 424, LA. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. (1928): "The published statutes and
digests of the other states and territories shall be prima facie evidence of
the statute laws of the state or territory from which they purport to emanate,
without being filed in evidence."
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(2) Articles which are different from prior jurisprudence.21
(3) Articles which restate pre-1928 statutes or jurispru-
dence, civil or criminal. 22
La. Acts 1922, No. 66, p. 128, LA. R.S. § 13:3717 (1950): "Printed
books or pamphlets purporting on their face to be the session or
other statutes of any of the United States, or the territories thereof,
or of any foreign jurisdictions, and to have been printed and pub-
lished by the authority of any such state, territory, or foreign juris-
diction, or proved to be commonly recognized in its courts, shall be
received in the courts of this state as prima facie evidence of such
statutes."
Art. 456, LA. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. (1928): "Every authentic act, unless
shown to be a forgery, makes full proof of its own execution, nor can the
recitals of such act be contradicted by any party thereto; but no instrument
under private signature is admissible in evidence, without proof of its
genuineness."
Art. 2244, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870: "The person against whom an
act under private signature is produced, is obliged formally to avow
or disavow his signature.
"The heirs or assigns may simply declare that they know not
the handwriting or the signature of the person they represent."
Art. 475, LA. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. (1928): "No legal adviser is permitted,
whether during or after the termination of his employment as such, unless
with his client's express consent, to disclose any communication made to
him as such legal advisor by or on behalf of his client, or any advice given
by him to his client, or any information that he may have gotten by reason
of his being such legal adviser."
Art. 2283, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870: "No attorney or counselor at
law shall give evidence of any thing that has been confided to him
by his client, without the consent of such client; but his being
employed as a counsellor or attorney, does not disqualify him from
being a witness in the cause in which he is employed."
21. The following articles of the Code of Criminal Procedure seem to be
somewhat different from the prior jurisprudence.
Art. 376, LA. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. (1928): "When a witness has been inten-
tionally sworn and has testified to any single fact in his examination in
chief, he may be cross-examined upon the whole case."
There is some confusion as to the rule in civil cases, see Comment, 10
TULANE L. REV. 294, 299 (1936).
Art. 484, LA. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. (1928): "Before a witness has been
sworn he can be neither corroborated nor impeached, nor is testimony to
establish the credibility of a witness admissible until that credibility has
been attacked."
See Pili4 v. Kenner, 2 Rob. 95 (La. 1842), holding that if the testimony
Of a witness is inherently improbable, the testimony may be corroborated
even though the credibility of the witness has not been attacked.
22. This group includes all of the evidence rules of the Code of Criminal
Procedure which could be applicable to civil cases which are not listed in
notes 20 and 21 supra, or note 23 infra. Two articles of the code, however,
are based on statutes applicable to civil cases and these statutes have now
been repealed.
Art. 427, LA. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. (1928): "Whenever any commercial
paper shall have been protested, either in or out of this state, for nonpayment,
the act of protest, or a certified copy thereof, shall be prima facie evidence
of the facts recited in said act."
LA. REV. STAT. § 326 (1870): "All notaries, or persons acting as
such, are authorized, in their protests of bills of exchange, promis-
sory notes or orders for the payment of money, to make mention of
the demand made upon the drawer, acceptor or person on whom such
order or bill of exchange is drawn or given, and of the manner and
circumstances of such demand, and by certificate added to such
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protest to state the manner in which any notices of protest were
served or forwarded; and whenever they shall have so done, a certi-
fied copy of such protest and certificate shall be evidence of all the
matters therein stated." (Italics supplied.) (This provision was not
incorporated in the revision of 1950.)
Art. 461, LA. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. (1928): "The competent witness in any
criminal proceeding, in court or before a person having authority to receive
evidence, shall be a person of proper understanding, but;
"(1) Private conversations between husband and wife shall be privileged.
"(2) Neither husband nor wife shall be compelled to be a witness on any
trial upon an indictment, complaint or other criminal proceeding, against the
other.
"(3) In the trial of all indictments, complaints and other proceedings
against persons charged with the commission of crimes or offenses, a person
so charged shall, at his own request, but not otherwise, be deemed a com-
petent witness."
This provision is a restatement of La. Acts 1916, No. 157, p. 379. The
original act, however, provided: ". . . That the competent witness in any
proceeding, civil or criminal, .. ." (Italics supplied.) WhenLa. Acts 1916, No.
157, p. 379, was incorporated into Title 13 of the Revised Statutes of 1950 [LA.
R.S. § 13:3665 (1950)] subdivisions (1), (2) and (3) were omitted.
Art. 495, LA. CODE OF CIUM. PlOC. (1928), as amended, La. Acts 1952, No. 180,
p. 426: "Evidence of conviction of crime, but not of arrest, indictment or
prosecution, is admissible for the purpose of impeaching the credibility of
the witness, but before evidence of such former conviction can be adduced
from any other source than the witness whose credibility is to be impeached,
he must have been questioned on cross-examination as to such conviction,
and have failed distinctly to admit the same; and no witness, whether he be
defendant or not, can be asked on cross-examination whether or not he has
ever been indicted or arrested, and can only be questioned as to conviction,
and as provided herein."
Prior to the 1952 amendment the article provided:
"Evidence of conviction of crime, but not of arrest, indictment or prose-
cution, is admissible for the purpose of impeaching the credibility of the
witness. But before evidence of such former conviction can be adduced
from any other source than the witness whose credibility is to be impeached,
he must have been questioned on cross-examination as to such conviction,
and have failed distinctly to admit the same; provided, always, that a
witness, whether he be the defendant or not, may be compelled to answer on
cross-examination whether or not he has ever been indicted or arrested and
how many times." The first part of this article as originally enacted was
taken verbatim-as were most of the evidence articles of the code-from
Marr's proposed code of criminal procedure of 1910 (Art. 530). The proviso
was added by the redactors of the 1928 code.
There seem to be no appellate cases discussing the right to question a
witness in civil suits as to prior arrests, indictments, or prosecutions. See,
however, Prevost v. Simeon, 4 La. 472, 475 (1832), in which the court said
that although it was error to allow a witness to be asked if he had not
committed larceny, since the appellant had previously introduced testimony
bolstering the credibility of the witness, both had committed error and the
case would not be reversed.
It seems certain, however, that prior to the adoption of the Code of
Criminal Procedure a witness in a criminal case could be asked if he had
ever been arrested, indicted, or prosecuted. State v. Dundas, 168 La. 95, 107,
121 So. 586, 591 (1929) (tried before the Code of Criminal Procedure went
into effect). See also State v. Hughes, 141 La. 578, 75 So. 416 (1917), allowing
a witness to be asked if he has not been accused of a crime. Since prior to
the Code of Criminal Procedure the rules were the same in civil and
criminal cases, such questions should have been permitted in civil cases
before 1928.
If it is held that the Code of Criminal Procedure provisions which
departed from the jurisprudence followed prior to its enactment are binding
in civil cases, it would seem that the 1952 amendment must also be followed
574 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [VOL. XIV
(4) Articles which contain innovations to Louisiana evi-
dence rules.28
(1) Articles which are different from prior statutes on civil
evidence. Only by finding that the legislature intended the codi-
fied rules of criminal evidence to supersede all prior conflicting
evidence law could the court hold that prior civil evidence stat-
utes were repealed. The case of State v. Batson,23a decided in
1902, presented a somewhat similar problem. The defendant
sought to introduce evidence admissible under a Civil Code pro-
vision, but inadmissible at common law. The majority of the court
did not even discuss the possibility of the Civil Code's provisions
being applicable to criminal cases. 24 Justice Breaux, however, in
in civil cases; for, if it was intended that the evidence articles of the code
apply to civil cases, it must have been intended that amendments to these
articles should also apply.
Conversely, if it is held that the Code of Criminal Procedure, when
enacted in 1928, did not supersede prior jurisprudence, there is no basis for
holding that a subsequent amendment to the code has this effect, and hence
it should still be permissible in civil suits to question a witness as to prior
arrests, indictments, and prosecutions.
23. The following articles of the Code of Criminal Procedure seem to
belong in this group.
Art. 423, LA. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. (1928): "The list of the registered
physicians and surgeons in this state published by the state board of health
and duly certified by the secretary of said board shall be received by the
courts of the state as proof that the physicians and surgeons therein named
are duly registered as required by law, provided that this method of proof
shall not be considered exclusive."
Art. 426, LA. CODE OF CrIM. PROC. (1928): "A copy of the articles of
any vessels, authenticated by the affidavit of the captain, shall be prima facie
evidence that any seaman whose name appears subscribed thereto has
actually signed articles."
Art. 476, LA. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. (1928): "No physician is permitted,
whether during or after the termination of his employment as such, unless
with his patient's express consent, to disclose any communication made to
him as such physician by or on behalf of his patient, or the result of any
investigation made into the patient's physical or mental condition, or any
opinion based upon such investigation, or any information that he may have
gotten by reason of his being such physician; provided, that the provisions
of this article shall not apply to any physician, who, under the appointment
of the court, and not by a selection of the patient, has made investigation
into the patient's physical or mental condition; provided, further, that any
physician may be cross-examined upon the correctness of any certificate
issued by him."
The courts have never directly held whether there was or was not a
doctor-patient privilege in civil suits. See note 31 infra.
Art. 477, LA. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. (1928): "No clergyman is permitted,
without the consent of the person making the communication, to disclose
any communication made to him in confidence by one seeking his spiritual
advice or consolation, or any information that he may have gotten by reason
of such communication."
23a. 108 La. 479, 32 So. 478 (1902).
24. The court said: "The Statute law to which the learned author refers
is, however, that contained in article 2245 of the Civil Code and article 325
of the Code of Practice, which relate to civil proceedings, whereas by section
976, of the Revised Statutes, hereinbefore quoted, it is provided that 'the
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an emphatic dissent said that since at common law the rules of
evidence were the same in civil and criminal cases, a statutory
modification of the civil rule also modified the criminal rule.25
The rule which the court held binding was of common law rather
than statutory origin; but the court said that since the common
law rules of evidence were adopted by statute for criminal cases,
it had no more power to modify these rules than it had to modify
a statute.
26
Although the question settled in the Batson case was very
similar to the problem under discussion, there are distinguishing
method of trial, the rules of evidence, and all other proceedings whatsoever
in the prosecution of crimes shall be according to the common law, unless
otherwise provided.' And no other provisions concerning the prosecution of
the crime of murder have been made." 108 La. 479, 491-2, 32 So. 478, 483
(1902).
For a discussion of the way the courts of other jurisdictions have
treated a criminal law statutory presumption which was sought to be
applied in a civil case, see Note, 43 A.L.R. 959 (1926).
25. 108 La. 479, 492, 32 So. 478, 483 (1902): "In this connection it may be
stated that generally the rules of evidence are the same in criminal cases
as in civil cases. There are exceptions, as stated by Best in his book on
Evidence (page 89). The text in Best does not exclude proof by handwriting.
... If the mode of proof is generally the same in civil and criminal proceed-
ings, and the exception does not include proof by comparison by [sic]
handwriting, the proof by comparison of handwriting under required con-
dition, in my view, is admissible. Beyond question, the rule is recognized in
civil proceedings in this state, and the evidence would have been admissible
in a civil case under the Codes. It is not convincing that the rule in question
does not apply to civil and criminal cases, and that, admissible in one, it is
not in the other."
26. After quoting LA. REV. STAT. § 976 (1870), the court said: "This is
merely a re-enactment of section 33 of the act of 1805, [see note 3 supra] but,
dealing with it as of the date of the adoption of the Revised Statutes, there
has since then been no other provision made with respect to 'the rules of
evidence' which are to be applied in the prosecution of the crime of murder;
and it therefore follows that we have only to ascertain what the common-
law rule applicable to the question at issue is, in order to determine whether
that question has been correctly decided." 108 La. 479, 490, 32 So. 478, 483
(1902).
The court has expressed a similar opinion on other occasions. In State v.
Denis, 19 La. Ann. 119, 120 (1867), the court said:
"It is unquestionably true, that when the common law rules of evidence,
in criminal proceedings, were adopted by the Legislature of this State; no
rule was better understood nor more firmly established than the one now
under consideration. It had always been deemed a wise and salutary one,
and had been uniformly adhered to.
"The discretion, which in the cases referred to, is claimed for Courts to
relax, to change, or to utterly disregard rules of criminal evidence, which the
Legislature has decreed it obligatory on them to observe, would be effectu-
ally to make the law a dead letter; cases might certainly occur, and this,
perhaps, is one of them, wherein a relaxation of the rule might serve to
advance the course of justice; but this is no reason why the general rules
of evidence should not be observed, and until the law of evidence in crim-
inal proceedings, now extant, is partially or wholly changed, our Courts are
not justified in exercising their discretion in regarding or disregarding rules
of evidence, which our Legislature has adopted as a system."
This statement was qUoted with approval in State v. Swaze, 30 La. Ann.
1323, 1327 (1878).
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features, In the Batson case the evidence statute which the court
refused to apply was in the Civil Code, and the Civil Code does
not contain a complete set of evidence rules. The Code of Crim-
inal Procedure, however, contains a fairly complete body of rules
of evidence, most of which could be applied to civil and criminal
proceedings. The court could find that the legislature intended
that this system of rules supersede all prior conflicting evidence
statutes.
Any discussion of what the legislature intended is likely to
be unrealistic. Then, as now, no one seemed greatly concerned
with civil evidence, and it is likely that the question of the appli-
cability of the code to civil suits was not present in the mind of
the legislators. Most of the facts, however, tend to show that
only rules of criminal evidence were being adopted. Although
two of the articles of the code seem to be more applicable to civil
than to criminal proceedings, 2T all of the rules are in a code of
criminal procedure and the words plaintiff and defendant are
never used; instead, the contestants are referred to exclusively
as state and accused. Further, it is not certain that the legislature
had the constitutional power to alter rules of civil practice in
this code. The constitutional amendment 28 which dispensed with
the usual formalities of reading and promulgating the code only
authorized a code of criminal procedure. 29
(2) Articles which are different from prior jurisprudence.
Even if the court finds there was no legislative intent that the
Code of Criminal Procedure supersede conflicting civil evidence
statutes, it might find that the evidence rules of the code replaced
prior conflicting jurisprudence. The Batson case held that a civil
evidence statute did not affect the rule for criminal cases, but
the reasoning of the court would not make the converse of this
necessarily true. The common law of evidence was brought into
criminal proceedings by a legislative act. In the Batson case the
court said that as a result of this act, only the legislature could
change a common law rule of evidence for criminal cases. The
27. See Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Articles 426, quoted note
23 supra, and 427, quoted note 22 supra.
28. La. Acts 1926, No. 262, p. 457.
29. It could be argued that the Code of Criminal Procedure was re-
enacted in the revision of 1950 without such a restriction, and by the same
token those statutes regulating civil evidence which were re-enacted in the
Revised Statutes can no longer be considered as statutes enacted prior
to the Code of Criminal Procedure.
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court found no such legislative change in the adoption of the
Civil Code.30
In civil cases, however, the common law was adopted by the
court itself, and what the court adopts, the court should have
power to change. At the time the court adopted the common law
there seem to have been a great many civil jury trials, and there
was no other system of evidence in existence suitable for that
type of proceeding. Now, however, in the Code of Criminal
Procedure the legislature has provided a fairly complete system
of evidence rules. Though these rules were formulated for jury
trials, and most Louisiana civil suits are tried without a jury, they
are as satisfactory for non-jury trials as are the common law
rules. The court could hold that since these rules are a reflection
of legislative opinion as to proper evidence rules, they will be fol-
lowed in preference to the common law. It could hold with equal
reason, however, that the legislature knew that the courts were
following the common law evidence rules in civil cases; and if
they had intended to make any change, they would have said so.
(3) Articles which restate pre-1928 statutes or jurispru-
dence, civil or criminal. The disposition made of the rules in
groups (1) and (2) should determine the court's attitude toward
the rules which fall into this classification. If the court finds that
the Code of Criminal Procedure did not repeal prior conflicting
evidence statutes, there would be no reason for it to hold that
prior evidence statutes which are restated in the code are affected
in any way. If the court finds, however, that the code repeals
prior conflicting civil evidence statutes it would seem to follow
that it also repealed, or made ineffective, prior statutes which it
merely restated. If this is true, a subsequent legislative repeal
of the earlier statute accomplishes nothing, and the rule as stated
in the code is still applicable to civil proceedings. This would
seem especially true of a legislative repeal which resulted from
the general revision of 1950, since a repeal resulting from the
revision of the statutes does not create a strong presumption of
legislative intent to remove a particular provision from civil
proceedings.
As for articles which merely restate the prior jurisprudence,
if the courts hold that they are bound to follow provisions of the
code which altered the rules contained in the prior jurisprudence,
they can hardly consider themselves not bound by rules of the
30. See note 24 supra.
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code which restated the prior jurisprudence. If, on the other
hand, the court should find that it is not bound by the provisions
which departed from the holdings in prior cases, there is no reason
for a finding that the code, by restating prior decisions, made
those decisions more binding.
Even if the Supreme Court finds that the provisions of the
Code of Criminal Procedure are not binding in civil suits, the
trial judge might use the code articles of this group, not as an
enactment of the law, but as a convenient restatement of the
earlier law which is reflected in these articles.
(4) Articles which contain innovations to Louisiana evi-
dence rules. The most important provisions of this group are the
doctor-patient and priest-penitent privileges. There are no pro-
visions for these in our present civil evidence statutes. There is
some inconclusive jurisprudence as to the doctor-patient privi-
lege,31 but none whatsoever concerning communications between
31. In State v. Lyons, 113 La. 959, 964, 37 So. 890, 892 (1904), the court,
after finding that the physician to whose testimony objection was made had
visited the accused as a friend, and not as his physician, said: "The objec-
tion was therefore inapplicable to the facts, and was properly overruled.
Whether it would have made any difference, under our law, if Dr. Richard
had been the attending physician, need not be considered."
The Louisiana Constitution of 1921, Art. VI, § 12, provides:
"The Legislature shall provide for . . . protecting confidential communi-
cations made to practitioners of medicine and dentistry and druggists by
their patients and clients while under professional treatment and for the
purpose of such treatment .. "
Prior to the enactment of the Code of Criminal Procedure in 1928, the
legislature had made no such provision. In State v. Genna, 163 La. 701, 112
So. 655 (1927), the defendant claimed that communications made to the
parish coroner who had visited him in his cell in an effort to determine
whether he was then insane were privileged communications between doctor
and patient. The court said that the constitutional provision was not self-
operative, and that there was no doctor-patient privilege in Louisiana. The
court indicated, however, that even if there were a doctor-patient privilege
the testimony in this case would not fall within such a privilege.
Both the Genna and Lyons cases were criminal prosecutions, but they
were decided prior to the enactment of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Since Louisiana civil and criminal evidence rules were then the same, the
decisions of those cases should still be applicable to civil cases unless the
civil evidence rule was changed by the adoption of the code.
Two Louisiana court of appeal decisions concerning the doctor-patient
privilege have been rendered since the adoption of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, but the possible applicability of Article 476 was not discussed.
In Shepard v. Whitney Nat. Bk., 177 So. 825, 826 (La. App. 1938), it was
objected that hospital records were privileged as communications between
doctor and patient. The court said: "We are referred to no authority which
sustains the contention . . . that such records are privileged communications
between doctor and patient." In Morgan v. American Bitumuls Co., 39 So.2d
139, 144 (La. App. 1949), the lower court had sustained an objection on the
ground that the question asked concerned a privileged communication be-
tween doctor and patient. The appellate court said: "There is no basis for
sustaining of this objection in a compensation case."
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priest and penitent. If the court adopts the rules of evidence of
the Code of Criminal Procedure as a system for civil cases, these
privileges would of course be included. If the court holds that
the rules of the code are not applicable as a system of evidence
for civil proceedings, there would seem to be no expression of
legislative intent that these communications be privileged in
civil proceedings.
Should the Rules of Evidence Be the Same in
Civil and Criminal Cases?
Even if it is found that the Code of Criminal Procedure had
no effect on civil evidence rules, most of the important rules of
evidence remain the same for both types of trials, since in most
instances the Code of Criminal Procedure merely restated the
prior evidence rules. As mentioned above,3 2 civil and criminal
evidence rules are the same at common law; and when both types
of cases are tried by the same type of tribunal, there seems to be
no reason for a different basic approach.
It is generally agreed, however, that the common law of
evidence is a rational system only for trial by jury. As Thayer
points out,3 3 all irrelevant facts must be excluded as a logical
necessity, regardless of the wisdom of the trier of fact, but in
developing a practical legal system it is not necessary that
we take as a premise that all logically relevant evidence must
be admitted.3 4 Some relevant evidence may be deemed privileged
In Rhodes v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 172 F.2d 183, 184 (5th Cir. 1949),
Art. 476, LA. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. (1928) was urged. The court said: "It is
not the function of courts, nor, indeed, is it in any way within the province
of the judiciary, where local law is administered under two codes, a criminal
and a civil, to transpose the provisions of the one to the other or to inter-
change the statutory principles they enunciate in the absence of express
authority. We are inclined, therefore, to the view that the privilege in
question is restricted to criminal proceedings. However, should it transpire
that we are mistaken in this view, it is clearly beyond doubt that the priv-
ilege may not be exercised by the plaintiff in this case. He failed to establish
himself in the stead of the person in whose favor the right existed, if it be
found to be applicable to a civil action."
32. See note 15 supra.
33. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 264
(1898).
34. So much relevant evidence has been excluded that, in Professor
Thayer's words, "What has taken place, in fact, is the shutting out by the
judges of one and another thing from time to time; and so, gradually, the
recognition of this exclusion under a rule. These rules of exclusion have had
their exceptions; and so the law has come into the shape of a set of primary
rules of exclusion; and then a set of exceptions to these rules." Id. at 265.
As a result of this development: "Rules, principles, and methods of legal
reasoning have taken on the color and used the phraseology of this subject,
and thus disguised, have figured as rules of Evidence, to the perplexity and
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to protect other social interests, which society considers so
important that to protect these interests society will allow its
interest in the correct finding of facts to be thwarted.8 5 The proba-
tive value of some relevant evidence is so slight in relation to
the time required for its introduction that it may be excluded.
The law may deem some matters of such social importance that
it may require that interests in these matters be proved only by
certain types of evidence.8 6 Evidence excluded for these reasons
would be excluded whether the trier were a judge alone, or a
lay jury. On the other hand, much logically relevant evidence-
such as hearsay and non-expert opinion-is excluded only be-
cause of the fear that a lay jury would give undue weight to
this type of evidence.
In France, where the weighing of facts is done by a judge,
there is no system of exclusionary rules.87 Admiralty courts38
and administrative tribunals in this country have never been
considered bound by the common law rules.8 9 Since most Loui-
siana civil cases are tried without a jury40 it would seem that the
strict rules of admissibility should not be applied in these pro-
ceedings.
As a' practical matter, it is impossible to accomplish com-
pletely the purpose of rules of exclusion when admissibility is
determined by the same person who must later weigh the evi-
dence. When the judge rules on admissibility, even if he does
not hear or see the proffered evidence, he must learn of its nature
to determine whether it should be let in. Since he knows the
content of the evidence, the most he can do is to strive to abstain
confusion of those who sought for a strong grasp of the subject. A bastard
sort of technicality has thus sprung up, and a crop of fanciful reasons for
anomalies destitute of reason, which baffle and disgust a healthy mind."
Id. at 273.
35. Such as communications between husband and wife, doctor and
patient, priest and penitent, lawyer and client.
36. Such as matters covered by the Statute of Frauds.
37. BODINGTON, AN OUTLINE OF THE FRENCH LAW OF EVIDENCE 2 (1904):
"Under the head of Relevancy, we shall search the Codes in vain for a pro-
vision excluding 'hearsay' or 'opinion' or evidence as to character. . . . The
documents put in are such as counsel consider will help his client's case."
38. 1 WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE
IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 4d (3d ed. 1940).
39. Section 7(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act [60 STAT. 237 (1946),
5 U.S.C. § 1006(c) (1946)] provides that, "Any oral or documentary evidence
may be received, but every agency shall as a matter of policy provide for the
exclusion of Irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence ......
40. It has been estimated that ninety-nine percent of all personal injury,
death, and workmen's compensation claim cases are tried without a jury.
Brumfield, Louisiana Practice-Trial de Novo on Appeal, NACCA 1951 San
Francisco Convention Proceedings 560, 561 (1952).
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from attributing probative weight to it if he holds it inadmis-
sible. 41 His mental process is directed toward applying the rules
of admissibility, and not toward analysis and proof; but if we can
assume that the trier is sufficiently analytical in his thinking to
be capable of completely excluding evidence which, though
inadmissible, is logically relevant and which he may consciously
or subconsciously feel should carry some weight, then the reason
for the exclusion-the trier's imputed lack of discernment-no
longer exists. It would seem then that a judge sitting alone
should be allowed to assign some probative weight to relevant
evidence which is presently excluded solely because lay juries
are not deemed capable of properly evaluating it. When such
evidence is admitted, however, the weighing process becomes
more difficult.
There is currently a great dispute in the courts as to the
extent to which an agency finding can be based on hearsay,42 or
non-expert opinion evidence. 43 If the trier's weighing of hearsay
is recognized, can a decision be based entirely on hearsay, or can
the trier reject direct assertion and accept hearsay? 4 Liberaliz-
ing the rules of evidence creates many new problems; but it
would seem that when the trier is permitted to evaluate the
maximum amount of relevant evidence consistent with his ability
to evaluate properly, the decision rendered is more likely to be
based on the true facts.
Conclusion
The Code of Criminal Procedure has been in effect for
twenty-six years and the Supreme Court has had no occasion to
41. 1 GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 81(e) (16th ed.
1899): "In trials of fact, without the aid of a jury, the question of the admis-
sibility of evidence, strictly speaking, can seldom be raised; since, whatever
be the ground of objection, the evidence objected to must, of necessity, be
.read or heard by the Judge, in order to determine its character and value.
In such cases, the only question, in effect, is upon the sufficiency and weight
of the evidence."
42. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §§ 144, 145 (1950).
43. Id. at § 146.
44. The Louisiana Supreme Court considered the general problem in
Rountree v. Brilliant Steamboat Co., 8 La. Ann. 289 (1853). Discussing the
trial court's allowing an essential point of the case to be established by
hearsay admitted without objection the court said: "Two witnesses ... were
permitted, without objection, to testify that they 'understood' afterwards he
died from the scalding and other wounds. We do not think the appellant here
can call upon us to disregard this testimony entirely, because it is hearsay.
. . . We do not say if a judgment came before us resting wholly on
hearsay evidence received below without objection, we should feel bound to
affirm it. It is unnecessary to push the inquiry to that extent. Here is a case
where hearsay evidence is accompanied by direct and unexceptionable testi-
mony, strongly indicating the probability of its truth." Id. at 290. The judg-
ment of the lower court was allowed to stand,
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rule on the effect of the evidence provisions of this code in civil
suits. Points of civil evidence are seldom presented to the appel-
late courts. From this it would seem that even though the proper
source of civil evidence rules is none too clear, the rules which
are presently applied by the trial courts do not seem to be a
source of great concern.
Roy M. Lilly, Jr.
Citation of Appeal in Louisiana
Appeals are favored in Louisiana procedure and will not
ordinarily be dismissed on mere technicalities. Support for this
principle may be found in statute' and in judicial decision. 2 Yet,
in at least one phase of the appellate procedure-that involving
citation of appeal-numerous technical and arbitrary rules can be
found which are entirely unnecessary to a workable and just
system.
The Code of Practice of 1825 originally provided for the
taking of appeal only by petition and citation.3 In 1843, Articles
573 and 574 of that code were amended so as to allow appeals to
be taken by motion in open court at the same term at which judg-
ment was rendered and without the necessity of citation of
appeal.4 In Prudhomme v. Edens,5 decided soon after the 1843
amendment, the trial judge granted an appeal upon motion made
in the term following that in which judgment had been rendered.
Recognizing that this procedure was not in accordance with the
provisions of the code articles, the Supreme Court, nevertheless,
1. Art. 898, LA. CODE OF PRACTICE of 1870; LA. R.S. § 13:4433 (1950).
2. Succession of Tullier, 216 La. 821, 44 So.2d 880 (1950); Picard v. Mutual
Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 212 La. 234, 31 So.2d 783 (1947); McCann v. Todd, 201 La.
953, 10 So.2d 769 (1942); Gulf States Finance Corp. v. Colbert, 61 So.2d 626
(La. App. 1952); Johnson v. Wyble, 55 So.2d 711 (La. App. 1951).
3. Art. 573, LA. CODE OF PRACTICE of 1825: "Whoever intends to appeal,
must present a petition to that effect to the court ... "
Art. 581, LA. CODE OF PRACTICE of 1825: "When an appeal has been taken,
... the clerk shall deliver a copy of the petition of appeal to the sheriff, to be
served on the appellee, together with a citation .... o
4. La. Acts 1843, No. 64, p. 40: "Be it enacted . . . . That Articles five
hundred and seventy three and five hundred and seventy four of the Code of
Practice be so amended that the party intending to appeal may do so either
by petition or by motion in open Court at the same term at which judgment
was rendered ... and when an appeal has been granted on motion in open
Court, no citation of appeal or other notice to appellee shall be necessary."
5. 6 Rob. 64 (La. 1843).
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